Тема: История Казахстана|
||16 Nov 2002, 05:22|
AN ETHNOHISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF THE RUSSIAN AND SOVIET EMPIRES
EDITED BY James S. Olson,
Lee Brigance Pappas and Nicholas C.J. Pappas -associate editors,
GREENWOOD PRESS, Westport, Connecticut - London, 1994, pp.355-367.
KAZAKH. The Kazakhs are a Central Asian, Turkic*-speaking peoples whose vast homeland, Kazakhstan, is located between the Caspian Sea, the Urals, and the Tien Shan Mountains in northwestern China. It is bordered in the north by the Russian Federated Republic, and to the south by Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzistan. Of all the Central Asian republics, Kazakhstan has the most widely varied landscape, together with extremes of temperature. During the existence of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan was second in size only to the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) itself. According to the census of 1989, there were 8,137,878 Kazakhs living in Kazakhstan, forming a minority in their own homeland. Over a million Kazakhs may also be found in the Russian and Uzbek republics, while smaller numbers reside in Turkmenistan and elsewhere in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In addition, there are over 600,000 Kazakhs in the Sinkiang-Uigur Autonomous Region of the Peoples Republic of China, as well as smaller numbers in Mongolia (71,000) and Afghanistan (20,000).
Kazakh, a Turkic language, is from the Kypchak* group, Kipchak-Nogai subgroup, in the Altaic branch of Ural-Altaic languages. It is most closely related to the languages of the Nogais* and Karakalpaks*. The Kazakh language retains a base vocabulary of Turkic words but, mirroring the complex history of speakers, it contains a large fund of loan words from Russian*, Mongol, Persian*, Arabic, and Chinese*. There is no native Kazakh alphabet; instead Kazakh was first written with the Arabic script, with the advent of Islam. That was abandoned in favor of Cyrillic in the 1920s. The Kazakhs place great emphasis on their oral literary tradition, which survives in the form of their epic poetry, the most highly evolved of that of any Turkic peoples. The Kazakhs also emphasize riddles and folk tales about their oral tradition, a trait they share with their Turkic cousins. Fortunately, modern Kazakh scholars have developed an abiding interest not only in collecting and preserving their traditional literature but also in developing a contemporary literature as well.
The ancestry of the present-day Kazakhs is extremely mixed and obscure - principally because of the lack of source material and because of their pre-literate culture for most of their history. The modern Kazakhs may be heirs to an extremely ancient culture, since the earliest unearthed artifacts can be dated t( the early Stone Age, around 300,000 years ago. Many directly traceable physical and material artifacts found in Kazakhstan go back as far as the Bronze Age and belonged to tribes with names such as the Sacae, Usun, Kang-yueh, and Alani. Later infusions of other groups, such as the Karluks and Turgash in the sixth and seventh centuries, the Oguz, Kimaks, and Kypchaks in the eighth to the eleventh centuries, the Khitans in the twelfth century, and, finally; the Kerait and Naiman in the early thirteenth century all contributed to the ethnic Turkic base that make up the Kazakhs. The Mongol conquest of Central Asia in the early thirteenth century played a tremendous role in the intermingling and interbreeding of these various groups to produce the Kazakh people.
The etymological origins of the Turkic term ''Kazakh,'' while engaging and worthy of analysis, serve only to confuse arid obscure the possible origins of the Kazakh people. The term emerged in Russian sources around the fourteenth century and had a wide range of meanings-horn someone with a "clean-shaven head except for a long topknot," to "independent, vagabond, freebooter adventurer, free warrior, nomad," and so on. The latter definition was probably a description of the Kazakhs' fame throughout Central Asia for their equestrian abilities and their freedom of movement. Another source claims that the word is a derivative of the Mongol word khasaq, which means a wheeled cart used by the Kazakhs to transport their portable felt yurts (tents) and other belongings. A nineteenth-century explanation claims that "Kazakh" derives from two Turkic words: kaz (goose) and ak (white). According to Kazakh lore, a legendary white steppe goose turned into a princess and gave birth to the first Kazakh. The word "Kazakh" also denotes an old Turkic social institution, referring to tribes who broke away from their prince or kinsmen. At any rate, it is most likely that the Kazakhs derived their name from this final meaning and that they evolved into an historically distinct group.
After the break-up of the Golden and White Hordes and of the other Mongol successor states in the late fourteenth century, the most important group to emerge from their ruins was the Uzbek* tribal confederation led by Barak Khan. Upon his death, Abu'l Khayr of the Shayban family conspired with one of Barak's chief rivals for the title of khan, thereby dispossessing the legitimate heirs. Khan Abu'l Khayr (reigned 1428-1468) was able to consolidate and strengthen the Uzbeks against the first of many periodic onslaughts from the east by the Dzungarian Oirots* (Chinese-speaking Muslims, related to the Buddhist Kalmyk* Mongols) in 1456. Several military setbacks, however, opened the way for an insurrection led by Barak's disinherited sons. Princes Janibek and Girey (also called Kirai) broke away from their own tribe. Abu'l Khayr died in 1468 fighting against these breakaway, or "Kazakh," nomads, but his famous grandson, Muhammad Shaybani Khan, later went to found the Shaybanid dynasty of Samarkand and Bukhara. Official Soviet histories name Janibek as the first Kazakh khan, who was succeeded by Girey's son Buyunduk; other sources maintain that Girey was the first elected khan and was succeeded by Buyunduk upon his death. At any rate, warfare between the Uzbeks under Muhammad Shaybani and the Kazakhs under Buyunduk continued for the rest of the fifteenth century. Soon after the Kazakhs' capture of the most important of the Syr Darya cities, Yasi (later known as Turkestan) and two khans made peace in 1500, and the Kazakhs took control over a readily definable and economically viable territory.
Warfare between various tribes and competing khans was always a very disruptive problem to the Kazakhs. By the beginning of the sixteenth century, however, other tribes, such as the Kypchaks, Naimans, and Argyns, were willing to unite under the strong leadership of Buyunduk's successor, Kasim Khan (reigned 1509?-1518). Indeed, it was then, during Kasim's tenure, that a true "Kazakh" people - united by language, culture, social organization, and the desire for an independent life free of empire-building khans ~ merged and initiated a period of peace and stability. After Kasim's death, internecine fighting broke out once again and the Kazakh state began to disintegrate. Around the same time (late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries), the Kazakhs organized themselves into three independent hordes (from the Turkic ordu, or army): the Ulu Zhuz, Orta Zhuz, and Kichi Zhuz (the Great Hundred, the Middle Hundred, and the Small Hundred). These three hordes were also known as the Older, Middle, and Younger Hordes, while their populations were known as the eastern, middle, and western Kazakhs. The third of these hordes generated a fourth horde, the Bukei, or Inner Horde, in the nineteenth century. These hordes together comprised the Kazakh Khanate. Each of these hordes was made up of clan, tribal, and family units that had cultural and organizational features in common with neighboring Turkic tribes such as the Nogais, Karakalpaks, and the Teleuts*. The Older Horde, based in Semirech'e, coalesced in the early sixteenth century, taking over the lands previously occupied by the early Sacae and Usun tribes from the fourth to the second centuries B.C., and encompassing the Usun, Kangly, Dulat, Albani, Suan, Jalair, and other tribes. The Middle Horde emerged in the early sixteenth century, and its lands came to embrace the Kypchak, Argyn, Naiman, Kerait, Uak, and Kongrat tribes that lived in the area. The Younger Horde consisted of three basic tribal confederations: the Zheti-Ru, Alim-Ulu, and the Bai-Uly.
Theoretically, each horde was headed by a great khan and was composed tribal divisions led by lesser khans. In reality, the great khan was seldom able to command all the tribes of his horde and was forced instead to rule through coalitions. The constituent tribes followed his directives only when there was an external threat, such as a military invasion. The khans were responsible representing their tribes or hordes in diplomatic contacts with outsiders. These hordes depended upon pastoral nomadism. Although a number of towns sprung up as centers for crafts and commerce, these were very widely scattered. Nonetheless, as a result of this urban influence, the tribes of the southern part Kazakhstan began to adopt the Sunni branch of the Hanafi school of Islam around the eighth century, and the religion increasingly penetrated northward in subsequent centuries. The Kazakhs converted at a relatively late date and were never very strong practitioners of their faith. Numerous shamanistic practices and beliefs continued to survive within their syncretistic form of Islam, which included a host of local demons and spirits, while their mullahs often doubled shamans. Socially, the Kazakhs were organized into two broad classes: the up class, which consisted of sultans, khans, chiefs, and tribal elders, together with their families and retinues; and, the lower class, which consisted of the masses and the slaves. Governing everyone were diverse tribal laws, some elements of Sharia law, and the civil decrees of the Khanate.
Informal trading contacts between the Kazakhs and their Russian neighbors had begun as early as the late sixteenth century, but these contacts, though eventually formalized by 1738, remained limited until the Dzungarians once again swept into Kazakhstan around 1680. The three Kazakh hordes were unable to put up any concerted resistance, owing to their own political infighting. As result, the Dzungarians were able to continue their periodic depredations until the early eighteenth century, at which time the Kazakhs were forced to seek Russian protection and at last came under a unified command. The Dzungaria were finally driven eastward into China where they were decisively defeated the Manchus* in 1758. In addition to the Dzungarians, the Kalmyk Mongols had begun to move into Kazakh territory beginning in 1718. Their major offensive thrust westward in 1723 caught the Kazakhs completely by surprise, forcing the latter to abandon their flocks and possessions and to flee wildly. During their subsequent campaign, which lasted until 1725, the Kalmyks took over the territories of the Small and Middle Hordes in central Kazakhstan, including lakes Tengiz and Balkhash. The Kazakhs found themselves completely unable manage a defense of their homeland against these nomadic incursions. The external threats, coupled with the Kazakhs' debilitating internal conflicts, convinced them of the necessity of swearing an oath of loyalty to the Russian crown and of forming a defensive alliance with Russia; the latter was in the process expanding eastward into Siberia and Central Asia. The Small Horde, led t another Khan Abu'l Khayr (reigned 1718-1749), formed such an alliance with Russia in 1731; the Middle Horde joined in 1740, and part of the Greater Horde finally joined in 1742. Together, the Russians and the Kazakhs were able to fend off the Kalmyk menace, but in so doing, Kazakhstan ceased to exist as an independent state. The Russians were so weakened from fighting that their advance into Kazakhstan was retarded for some time. Despite such temporary setbacks, however, the Kazakhs very quickly became subject to Russian influence and control.
The tsarist government began to construct a series of forts at key locations and to station' large contingents of soldiers in the area. In addition, the Russians encouraged European and Russian immigration to Kazakhstan, where these groups expelled the natives and competed for the most productive agricultural lands. As part of their oath of fealty to the Russian throne, the Kazakhs had been obliged to accept Russian apportionment of their hunting grounds. Therefore, by the provisions of the ukase (decree) of 1756 (a settlement between the Russians and the Bashkirs*), the Kazakhs were prohibited from using the fertile pasturage known as the "Inner Side", between the Ural and Volga rivers. This ban placed tremendous pressure on the Kazakhs' already shrinking pasturage and started a vicious cycle of economic deprivation and hardship and has characterized their relationship with Russia up to the present day. The Kazakhs' continued use of the pasturage brought Russian reprisals, in the form of herd reductions that further strained their economy. For the Kazakhs, this period in, their history is called Aqtaban Shubirindi, or the "Great Retreat". In addition to the punitive herd reductions, the tsarist government, upon the death of Abu'l Khayr, began a policy of disruptive meddling in the political affairs of the three hordes.
Abu'l Khayr's son and successor in the Small Horde, the unpopular Nur Ali Khan (reigned 1748-1786), came to the throne with Russian backing. He became a virtual puppet of the Russians, since he was otherwise unable to consolidate his position against his main rival, Sultan Batir Janibek. In spite of this political handicap, Nur Ah was able, at times, to pursue an independent policy toward Russia and to strike an equilibrium between both Russia and China. Since the Russians considered their relationship with the Small Horde as a showcase that had the potential for making inroads against the other Kazakh hordes, they were careful to treat Nur Ali with due considerations. In order to treat the nomadic Kazakhs in a more rational diplomatic manner, the Russian government built a fixed residence for Nur Ali in 1767, just as they had earlier built sheds and stables for his herds. In spite of Russian solicitousness, however, major friction between the Russians and the Small Horde continued. The conflicts centered around the use of the Inner Side pasturage (which the Russians had granted to Bashkir claimants), Nur Ali's perception of a conspiracy between his own brothers and Catherine II to prevent the succession of his son Ishim, and the mysterious deaths at Orenburg of two successive sons whom Nur Ali had entrusted to the Russians as hostages.
It was during this period of high tension between the Russian government and the Small Horde that the Pugachev Revolt of 1772-1774 flared up. It became the main channel for Kazakhs dissatisfaction with the Russians and ultimately involved the Cossacks* against the Kazakhs. Emelyan Pugachev was an illiterate Don Cossack* who, wanting revenge for the mistreatment of his people by the Russian government, took advantage of the widespread rumor that Catherine II's husband, Peter III, had not actually been murdered. Pugachev, claiming to be Peter, soon found himself at the head of an army of rebellious malcontents and dispossessed serfs. Pugachev and his rabble eventually fought their way to the Ural Mountains, to a territory adjacent to that of the Small Horde. While the Russians were preoccupied with fighting Pugachev, especially during the unsuccessful siege of Orenburg in 1774, the Kazakhs were able to raid the Russian settlements and to take their herds into the forbidden pasturage of the Inner Side. In addition, the Small Horde entrusted, 200 Kazakhs to Pugachev as security, granted 400 rebels protection in Kazakh territory, and committed a few thousand Kazakh troops to the siege of Orenburg.
More serious, however, was the Kazakh Rebellion of 1773-1776, which had been touched off by Pugachev's revolt and which continued beyond his defeat and execution. The goal of the Kazakh Rebellion was to gain access and control of the Inner Side, but internal discord among competing factions against Nur Ali's rule rendered success nearly impossible. Those allied against Nur Ali were led by an anonymous warrior identified in Kazakh folk tales only as the Invisible Man. After Pugachev's surrender, Nur Ali quickly allied himself with the Russians, a situation that only reinforced the opposition's resistance to him as a puppet of the Russians. Outright civil war threatened the Small Horde as the khans were unable to control the opposing clans. Eventually, in February 1775, the Russians were compelled to send a detachment of 300 Cossacks and 500 Bashkirs to restore order. The Cossacks were able to quash the rebellion by the summer of 1776, for which the Russian rewarded them with grants of land in Kazakhstan's already shrinking pasturage. The loss of large amounts of pasturage to the Cossack and Russian colonizers, coupled with the general brutality of the Cossack advance, provoked a tremendous amount of hostility and guerrilla resistance from the beleaguered Kazakhs. Nur Ali's quickly diminishing authority continued to evaporate.
Throughout this same period, the Russians were also making separate attempts to strengthen their ties with the Middle Horde. In 1731, the Russian government sent an emissary to Semeke Khan of the Middle Horde, offering him official recognition and suzerainty. Semeke, like the other Kazakh khans, was wont to treat his relationship with the Russians as an expedient to minimize the threat posed by the Dzungarians. For this reason, his relationship with the Russians appeared capricious and undependable. Semeke died in 1733 before the patents of investiture, naming him khan of the Middle Horde, could be conferred upon him. His son and successor, Abu'l Muhammad, was obliged to share power with another leader, Ablai Khan, who was the stronger of the two. In 1740, as a result of renewed hostilities with the Dzungarians, the two leaders went to Orenburg to swear fealty to the Russians, and so came, albeit very loosely, into the Russian orbit. For about twenty years, Ablai shared rulership with Abu'l Muhammad, gradually easing the latter out of the seat of power by the year 1750. From then until his death in 1781, Ablai skillfully vacillated between the Russians and the Chinese, manipulating both powers to his horde's benefit. For example, Chinese sources claim that Ablai became a tributary to the Manchus, something that the Russian sources vigorously deny. Ablai led his tribe across the borders to pasturage in both empires and attacked border settlements at will. He flouted his relationship with the Russian border authorities while simultaneously claiming that his submission to China had been involuntarily. For its part, Catherine's government attempted to woo Ablai firmly back into the Russian fold by building him a permanent palace and village, granting him an annual allowance of grain, and so forth. But Ablai was able to spurn these offers and to snub others at will. He thus maintained a good measure of tribal unity and political independence for the rest of his tenure. Following Ablai's death in 1781, however, his son Vali, like Nur Ali Khan of the Small Horde, soon came under the domination of the Russians. He controlled only a few of the clans, while the majority of the elders elected their own nominee, who ruled with the support of the Chinese. By the end of the eighteenth century, Vali had dissipated his power to the Russians, who made the position of the khan largely honorary.
The history of the Greater Horde was significantly different from those of the other two Kazakh hordes. Instead of gradual assimilation and a dissipation of political power to the encroaching Russian state, the Greater Horde experienced a progressive break-up and diaspora away from its traditional base in the Semirech'e region around the southern end of Lake Balkhash. The majority of the Greater Horde Kazakhs had been under the political control of the Dzungarian khanate. In the 1730s, however, when the other hordes were swearing their fealty to the tsarist government, one group of the Greater Horde Kazakhs broke off and joined with Er Ali, the son of Abu'l Khayr of the Small Horde. When the Chinese defeated the Dzungarians in 1758, the remaining majority of the Greater Horde Kazakhs came under Chinese control and obtained the right to move into former Dzhungar territories. Those Kazakhs who wanted to take advantage of the opportunity to claim these rich pasturelands migrated into Dzungaria, while others moved to the Tashkent area east of the Aral Sea. This third group mixed with the native Karakalpak population and settled down to a semi-sedentary existence. Those Kazakhs who remained encamped in the traditional homelands in Semirech'e, abutting as it did Dzungaria, managed to establish their independence from China.
By the early nineteenth century, the Greater Horde Kazakhs of the Tashkent and Semirech'e region were subject to expansionist incursions not only by the Russians but by the Khokand Khanate of the Uzbeks, led by Shaybanid Omar Khan (reigned 1809-1822) and his successor Muhammad Ali Khan (reigned 1822-1840), as well. Sultan Suiuk, son of Ablai Khan of the Middle Horde, decided in 1818 to cast his lot with the Russians. This move was responsible for bringing 55,000 Kazakhs under Russian rule and for establishing a Russian foothold in the area for future penetration. Nonetheless, many of the ruling-class Kazakhs in these two regions recognized the suzerainty of the Khokand Khanate because it allowed them to retain their former social status and taxation privileges; the herder and farmer classes vacillated between Russia and Khokand as their tax burdens dictated. For their part, the Khokand khans persuaded the Kazakhs to support them because of their shared Islamic heritage, arguing that the Russians, as infidels, were illegitimate rulers of Muslims. The Russians constructed the Siberian military line, which not only demarcated Russian possessions from those of the Chinese but also constituted the frontier outposts of the struggle against Khokand and its allies, the khanates of Kiva and Bukhara. The Great Horde Kazakhs recognized Russian suzerainty in 1844 and were finally incorporated into the Russian Empire by 1865, following Russia's conquest of Tashkent, Aulie-Ata, Turkestan, Merke, and Chimkent, which had cut the Kazakhs off from Khokand. The final annexation of the Khokand Khanate itself was accomplished in 1876.
From the end of the Pugachev Revolt until well into the twentieth century, the Kazakhs put up an almost continuous resistance to the Russian government. In turn, the Russians came to distrust Nur Ali and the Kazakhs' and were thus increasingly motivated to rule the Kazakhs directly, allowing the khan to devolve into a mere figurehead. The questions of pasturage in the Inner Side and of land tenure remained paramount in Kazakh dealings with the Russians and often brought them into direct confrontations with the Cossacks, who had been awarded those Inner Side lands that had not previously been allocated to the Bashkirs. The Russians also began to refer to the Kazakhs as the "Kyrgyz Kazakhs" or the "Siberian Kyrgyz," to distinguish them from the Slavic Cossacks in whose midst many Kazakhs lived. In 1782, the Russians gave permission for Nur Ali and his family to use the Inner Side. This situation only created more problems, as it fueled the popular. view of Nur Ali as a selfish opportunist and encouraged other clans to flout the ban. Armed clashes broke out between Kazakhs and Cossacks and also among the Kazakhs themselves throughout 1782-1783. Discontent flared into open revolt on numerous occasions, beginning with Sirim Batir's revolt of 1783, which Involved part of the Middle Horde against the Cossacks. In response, the Russians were compelled to tighten their grip on political developments in Kazakhstan. Since Nur Ali was unable to control the Kazakhs as the Russians had demanded of him, the leading Kazakh elders met in 1785 to depose Nur Ali in favor of his brother, Er Ali. Other measures, such as the Igel'strom Reform of 1787-1790, which was initiated to pacify the warring clans, actually called for the abolition of the khanate and the division of the Small Horde into three different administrative units. The result was a virtual Russian protectorate over the Kazakhs, through which the former began actively to assimilate the Kazakhs into the Russian Empire.
In 1801, the Russian government created the Bukei, or Inner Horde, named for Nur All's son Sultan Bukei, in response to the perennial Kazakh need for more pastureland. This horde was allowed to take up residence in the area between the Volga and Ural rivers, in nominally Russian land. It was hoped that the creation of the Bukei Horde would alleviate the land problem, as indeed it did for the next twenty-five years. But the Horde prospered and grew so large that the old land problem surfaced again, becoming worse than ever. The Russians then embarked on a two-pronged program of acculturation in order to domesticate the Kazakhs. First, Russian schools were founded, beginning in 1789, which not only taught the Russian language to Kazakh children but inculcated them with the fundamentals of Western-style civilization. Second, throughout the nineteenth century, the Russians encouraged the practice of Islam. Compared to other Muslims who came under Russian rule, such as the Crimean Tatars* and Volga Tatars*, the Kazakhs did not reach the levels of economic, social, political, and cultural development of these other, more sedentary Muslims. As a result, they were more susceptible to economic and cultural influence, but less prone to social and political control. The policy of promoting Islam generally proved to be a long-term failure from the Russian perspective, since it encouraged conservatism and exclusivity among the Kazakhs. The Russians also tried other measures, such as providing free seed, loans, and tax exemptions to certain Kazakhs and permitting the Kazakhs to graze their herds in Cossack lands. Nonetheless, the anarchy engendered by the paralysis of the khan's authority, the virtually continuous state of warfare in Kazakhstan, and the encroachments of the Khivan Uzbeks into the Greater Horde all threatened the future of Russian trade and expansion in Kazakhstan. Finally, in 1824, the Russians were compelled to abolish the khanate completely in the Middle Horde, to modify it in the Small Horde, and to annex the territory of the Greater Horde entirely.
From then until the I860s, the Speransky Reforms (formally known as the Rules on the Siberian Kyrgyz, promulgated in 1822), together with other reforms, were responsible for sweeping changes in the political and economic organization of the Small and Middles Horde Kazakhs. Ruling the Middle Horde from Omsk, the Russians divided the Kazakhs into administrative units, the smallest being the clan or aul (rodavia uprava), consisting of approximately fifteen homogeneous families. In turn, ten to twelve auls were organized into volosts (inorodnaia uprava); eighty-seven volosts made up four okrugs (districts), of which there were eventually seven. The Russians introduced a representative assembly into each okrug, which contained not only Kazakh representatives but Russian ones as well, sent by the Orenburg authorities. Still the overall administration of the Kazakhs remained in the hands of the Orenburg Frontier Commission. The reforms also attempted to induce the Kazakhs to become sedentary and to engage in farming, for which they were given plots of land, tools, and seed. The pomp and ceremony of the Kazakh nobility were maintained, while their powers were drastically curtailed; for example, they could use their hereditary titles and own land but were prohibited from owning serfs. The Orenburg Kyrgyz (formerly, the Small Horde Kazakhs) were ruled by a sultan-administrator, who’s regularized duties gave him the use of an assistant, a secretary (scribe), a staff of five messengers, and a detachment of 100 to 200 Cossacks. This set-up was later extended to the Inner Horde as well. The Russians envisioned the functioning of the Kazakh civil service class as resembling that of an up-to-date, bureaucratic machine that could efficiently process tsarist mandates among the local natives. In practice, the Kazakh bureaucracy never functioned as well as the traditional political structures had. Indeed, it sometimes even exacerbated crisis situations, as the masses were wont to lump their own native rulers in with the Russian enemy. The political problem, in short, was that the Russians effectively destroyed the Kazakh aristocracy in the first half of the nineteenth century without creating anything to replace it.
The political reorganization of the Small and Middle Hordes while far-reaching and thorough, surprised the tsarist government by its failure to ameliorate the continuing resistance among the clans. As always, the crux of Kazakh discontent was the need for more grazing land, the pressures for which resulted in two major uprisings. First, the hard winter of 1826-1827 forced many Kazakhs to risk the confiscation of their herds as a result of their search for pasturage across the Ural River. The Inner Horde Kazakhs made similar attempts to cross the Ural with their herds again in 1827-1828 and in 1829; each time, they were met with Russian armed force. This political and economic disruption, combined with frequent, localized violence, the continuing tax burden in the face of economic crisis, and the coercive presence of the Cossacks, provided the perfect pre-conditions for the revolt of Kenisary Qasimov, grandson of Ablai Khan of the Middle Horde. He is viewed by many Kazakhs as the first Kazakh nationalist. The revolt, lasting from I837 to 1846,had as its most immediate cause the abolition of the rank of khan, but this issue soon became a lightning rod for all manner of discontents. Kenisary's movement excited mass support and alarmed the Russian authorities because his prestige and charisma threatened to bring the other hordes into what could have evolved into a full-scale Kazakh war. At any rate, Kenisary's revolt, with over 20 000 warriors at his command, was significant as the last concerted action by the horde. In the face of continuing resistance, the Russians attempted further political measures, land reforms, and social re-combinations throughout the rest of the nineteenth century. All of these failed to pacify the essentially nomadic, herding culture of the Kazakhs.
A second and more violent revolt in July 1916 was centered in the Semirech'e region. In order to cope with the demands of World War I, the Russians issued edicts to the already overburdened Kazakhs, increasing their taxes and animal quotas and, for the first time, obliging them for military service through the draft. The Kazakhs, who had traditionally been exempted from military service by the tsars, interpreted the edicts as heralding a change in the policy toward the people of the steppes. They responded by attacking Russian and Cossack villages indiscriminately, killing some 2,500 Russians and Cossacks. The Russians responded by organizing a military force that drove some 300,000 Kazakhs either to flee into the mountains or else across the border into Chinese Sinkiang. Most of the Kazakhs' livestock, including 60 percent of their cattle, and their immovable belongings were looted by the colonists living among them. When they returned in the summer of 1917, around 83,000 starving and defenseless Kazakhs were slaughtered and, in some instances, burned alive by vengeful colonists. An additional million would later die of starvation during the 1921-1922 famine after losing' their cattle to the Slav settlers, the White forces, and the Bolsheviks.
With relief and optimism, the Kazakh people welcomed the news of the February 1917 Revolution in Russia, which installed a provisional government under Premier Alexander Kerensky. The few intellectuals in Kazakh society at the time enthusiastically set about creating a Kazakh nationalist party, the Alash Orda, founded by Bukei Khan-uli; this organization was intended to represent the Kazakhs in the Russian parliament. The Kazakhs believed that the new government would work to rectify their long-standing grievances and perhaps even afford them a measure of autonomy. They were quickly disappointed, however, when the Bolsheviks took over in November and disbanded the constitutional government. For their part, the Kazakhs were bitterly divided into pro- and anti-Bolshevik camps that were too preoccupied with feuding among themselves to present a united front against the Communists. Those unable to support the new regime turned to the Alash Orda, transforming the party into an autonomous government that fought beside the tsarist White forces against the Bolsheviks. After the defeat of the Whites, the Bolsheviks created the Kyrgyz (Kazakh) Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) within the RSFSR on August 26, 1920. Many Kazakhs then began to look toward accommodation with the new Soviet government, while the Alash Orda began to take on the character of a powerful nationalist movement.
Kazakh nationalism was fueled by the Stalinist policy of forced collectivization. The Soviet government appointed Filip I. Goloshchokin as Kazakhstan Party Secretary; in this capacity, he was responsible for encouraging the resumption of the colonization of Kazakhstan, a process facilitated by the opening of the Turkestan-Siberian Railway line, which cut across the eastern part of Kazakhstan, in 1930. In addition, Goloshchokin attempted to settle and collectivize around 400,000 Kazakh nomads. Kazakh nationalists, seeing the forced collectivization as an attempt both to russify the Kazakhs and to confiscate their cattle, resisted the policy bitterly. Nearly 70 percent of the collectives collapsed in 1932 when the Kazakhs fled into Chinese Sinkiang rather than submit to collectivization. The total Kazakh population declined by 22 percent, or roughly 1,500,000 persons, between 1926 and 1939, while towns and cities became predominantly Russian centers. Some of the drop can be attributed to the out-migration of Kazakhs to Sinkiang and Uzbekistan, but most of it was due to the violence of their resistance and to starvation.
In the same period, the Kazakhs slaughtered up to 80 percent of their herds, at first to prevent their nationalization but later to prevent the animals' starvation. This action proved to be the greatest hardship on the livestock-oriented Kazakh economy. By 1939, Kazakhs made up less than 50 percent of the population of their own republic. For his mistakes, Goloshchokin was removed shortly after the collectivization debacle, but abrupt depopulation of Kazakhstan had an adverse effect on the long-term political and economic health of the region. Agricultural output fell to one-third of its pre-war level. Soviet concessions to encourage the Kazakhs' return and allegiance (in the form of allowing some private ownership of livestock) only served to stimulate the activities of Trotskyists, Bukharinists, and Kazakh "nationalist deviationists". For their part, Kazakh nationalists countered the tightening of the Soviet grip with active measures to halt further Russian colonization of the steppe and to drive out the ones already there. They envisioned a Kazakhstan that was for the Kazakhs; the Russian, Cossack, and Ukrainian* peasants would receive their share of land only after the Kazakhs themselves had been satisfied. The Soviet government, declaring these acts illegal, immediately eliminated the Kazakh nationalists from the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, a political blow from which the Kazakh nationalist wing never fully recovered. Soviet authorities in Kazakhstan were also obliged to deal with the Alash Orda, which they first courted, then actively persecuted, and eventually succeeded in suppressing.
The Stalinist political purges of the late 1920s and again in the late 1930s completed the process of breaking down the Kazakhs' resistance toward integration into the Soviet state. Those who voiced opposition to Moscow's policies were criticized for "bourgeois nationalism" and were, in many cases, purged. Some leading Kazakhs were removed in 1925, while others - even opponents of the Alash Orda - disappeared in 1927. The local ruling elite was liquidated, beginning in 1935, the Kazakh Communist Party was created in 1937, and the Kazakh national leadership had virtually disappeared by 1938. They were replaced in many cases by handpicked Russians, but native Kazakhs did assume political positions when their political loyalty was beyond question. These factors worked to change entirely the social and political complexion of the Kazakh people.
ln spite of - or perhaps because of - these drastic political and cultural changes, the Kazakh economy remained stagnant until the early 1950s. But, in 1953, Nikita Khrushchev decided to transform the tremendously fertile but "under-utilized" lands of southern Siberia and northern Kazakhstan into a new breadbasket region for the Soviet Union. This so-called "Virgin Lands" policy not only required of the Kazakhs yet another economic shift, this time from grain-growing state farms (sovkhoz) to livestock-breeding state farms, but also a whole new bureaucratic apparatus, including the young Leonid Brezhnev, handpicked by Moscow to ensure the success of the new venture. These changes drew the two governments closer together and led to the integration of the Kazakh economy and party more fully into the Soviet administration. In addition to the Virgin Lands policy, the Soviets worked from World War II onward to transform Kazakhstan into a major industrialized center. For example, the third-largest coal-producing center in the Soviet Union was located in central Kazakhstan; the space exploration center is also located there. Oil production and copper mining were stimulated, and large numbers of Russian and Ukrainian technicians and skilled workers were imported into the region to staff the various enterprises. By their very concentration, they contributed to the urbanization of Kazakhstan.
After Brezhnev became General Secretary, he appointed a Kazakh party hack named Dinmukhamed Kunaev to fill his vacated position as first party secretary back in Kazakhstan. Kunaev held the position until December 1986, when he was removed by President Mikhail Gorbachev and replaced by an ethnic Russian. The news of his dismissal led to growing dissatisfaction among nationalist elements within Kazakh society, resulting in rioting, in which several persons were killed, and compelling Gorbachev to act with more sensitivity during the perestroika ("restructuring") era. Other indications that the Kazakhs were heeding the nationalist call were to be found in Soviet publications issued from Kazakhstan since the 1 970s. For example, one letter published in the Sotsialistik Kazakhstan criticized the seemingly deliberate bad spelling of Kazakh language signs, the nonsensically literal translations from Russian, and the use of Russian loan words, even when Kazakh equivalents were available; all were signs of passive resistance on the part of the Kazakhs. Other editorial comments in newspapers included lectures on the need to rebuff nationalistic epidemics and the scolding of writers and artists for "enthusiasm and distortion." In the rural areas, nationalism was manifested by the maintenance of traditional customs and attitudes.
The Kazakhs became champions of reform of the Soviet system through their attempts to secure greater autonomy from Moscow. Gorbachev's perestroika appeared to offer them that opportunity. For example, a 1987 law abolished all restrictions on the number of animals that a farmer could maintain, resulting in a boom in the sheep, goat, and cattle populations. This, in turn, spurred a tremendous growth in meat sales. Kazakh nationalists also supported Gorbachev, maintaining that dangerous degree of support even through the coup attempted by Soviet hardliners against Gorbachev on August 19, 1991. Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev came to international attention by publicly condemning the coup attempt and calling for Gorbachev's restoration. After the failed coup, Nazarbayev pressed his country's advantage by severing all ties with the discredited Communists and with the Kazakh Communist Party, which was compelled to disband. The politically astute Nazarbayev did not call for an immediate declaration of independence from Moscow; indeed, he strongly supported some form of continued union until it became obvious that the old union was dead. This move was necessary because Kazakhstan's economy, society, and culture are still strongly linked with those of Russia.
Since the failed coup of 1991, the citizens of Kazakhstan have created a presidential-parliamentary system of government that closely resembles that of Russia. Nazarbayev ran unopposed for its presidency. He continues to lack political opposition from his constituency, probably because he has not acted in a dictatorial manner, appears to be in favor of political pluralism, and enjoys the support of Russians as well as of ethnic Kazakhs. Nazarbayev has also taken an active role in international relations by joining with Boris Yeltsin in a mediation effort between Azerbaijan and Armenia and with the presidents of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus to create the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), in a treaty signed in Alma-Ata. U.S. diplomatic concern centers around the continued presence of nuclear weapons in Kazakhstan; the United States is attempting to persuade the Kazakhs to return those weapons to the Russians. When Nazarbayev paid a visit to Washington in May 1992, he gave assurances that he would not oppose the withdrawal of those weapons within seven years and indicated a willingness to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but only because American policymakers pledged to protect Kazakhstan in the event of a threat by a nuclear power. Most recently, the Kazakhs have been assembling a constitution that guarantees human rights to its citizens.
REFERENCES: Shirin Akiner, Islamic Peoples of the Soviet Union, 1983; W. Barthold, "Kazak," in Encyclopedia of Islam, 1983, 848-49; Rene Grousset, The Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central Asia, 1970; Martha Brill Olcott, The Kazakhs, 1987; Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923, 1980; Michael Rywkin, ed., Russian Colonial Expansion to 1917, 1988; M. Wesley Shoemaker, ed., Russia, Eurasian States, and Eastern Europe, 1992, 1992; Wayne S. Vucinich, Russia and Asia: Essays on the Influence of Russia on the Asian Peoples, 1972; Joseph L. Wieczynski, The Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet History, 1984, vol.38.
Lee Brigance Pappas
|| 9 Dec 2002, 03:11|
"...В советский период учебники истории представляли собой весьма яркое отражение царившего в стране Зазеркалья. Прокламируемый интернационализм был чуть закамуфлированным русским шовинизмом, декларируемые свободы - отменялись реально существовавшим тоталитаризмом, гармонизация национальных отношений - удушением национальных культур и русификацией. Учебники истории, по которым велось обучение в школах (многие из них сохранились в учебной практике до сего дня) были построены на основе экономического детерминизма, историцизма и коммунистической партийности.
В плане национальной политики это были учебники, призванные обеспечить военно-политическое единство «новой исторической общности - советского народа». Основой их была «опрокинутая в прошлое» политика советского империализма и русской державности. Вся концепция истории была построена как схема развития русской государственности от Киевской Руси до Российской империи и Советского Союза.
Национальные истории других народов присутствовали в них лишь постольку, поскольку соприкасались с русской историей. Как правило, это были военные столкновения и захваты русскими правителями новых земель. Характерно объяснение завоеваний «нерусских окраин» различными теориями от «меньшего зла» (20-30-е гг.) до «прогрессивной тенденции к объединению» и «добровольного вхождения в состав России» (40-80-ее гг.). В рамках этих нехитрых объяснений и жестких правил находились все немногочисленные упоминания о нерусских народах СССР и их государствах. Например, единственное упоминание о Хазарском каганате и Волжской Булгарии было в разделе о войнах Святослава, о народах Прибалтики вспоминали периодически в связи с Ливонской и Северной войнами, а народы Поволжья и Сибири попали на страницы учебников исключительно в связи с русскими завоеваниями. Единственным исключением был самостоятельный небольшой раздел о народах Средней Азии и Закавказья.
Игнорировалась история ислама в России. Если о христианстве упоминалось и во время принятия Владимиром православия, при описании русской культуры и далее, то ислам только упоминался как реакционная, консервативная и враждебная сила (наиболее ярко в разделе о завоевании Северного Кавказа, при характеристике религиозных аспектов движения Шамиля).
Весьма показательно описание истории Улуса Джучи в учебнике истории.
«Героическим сопротивлением русского народа Центральная и Западная Европа была спасена от ужасов монголо-татарского вторжения и получила возможность для дальнейшего развития своей экономики и культуры. Ни одна страна в Европе не подверглась такому страшному нашествию, какое обрушилось на Русь.
Монголо-татарское нашествие оказало глубоко отрицательное влияние на исторические судьбы народов, очутившихся под ударами завоевателей. Многие районы, куда вторглись захватчики, пришли в запустение, обезлюдели. Страшно разорены были русские земли. ...Значительно более тяжелым было положение среднеазиатских, закавказских и ряда других территорий. Имевшие решающее значение для местного земледелия ирригационные системы были уничтожены, плодородные оазисы запустели, на место оседлых земледельцев и скотоводов пришли многочисленные кочевые племена. Сократилась площадь обрабатываемых земель, местные скотоводы были оттеснены с обильных высокогорных пастбищ в ущелья, пришли в упадок города, редкими стали торговые караваны. Наступил период длительного хозяйственного застоя.
...Под власть Золотой Орды подпали народы Средней Азии, в том числе территории древнего Хорезма, Северного Кавказа, Крыма, Поволжья. Русь непосредственно в Орду не входила - она сохранила свою государственность, но правители русских земель были поставлены в зависимость от ханов».
Картина, обрушившихся на Евразию в XIII в. бедствий и ужасов, хотя во многом справедлива, но содержит явные черты православной церковной историографии, которая рассматривала монгольское завоевание как малый Апокалипсис и преувеличивала соответственно страдания русского народа. Одновременно здесь присутствует стремление оправдать монгольским завоеванием отставание России от развитых стран Европы и скрытое обвинение Запада в «неблагодарности» по отношению к народам его защитившим. Постоянно подчеркивались ущербность скотоводческого хозяйства по отношению с оседлым, а также извечная агрессивность кочевников. Между тем, как свидетельствуют исторические источники, на период существования Улуса Джучи (Золотая Орда) приходится расцвет городов, ремесла и торговли. В недрах этой средневековой империи происходит становление своеобразной культуры, развивается свой язык и литература, складывается татарский этнос. Несомненно, также включение русских княжеств в состав Улуса Джучи на правах вассалитета. В учебниках по традиции историков «государственной школы» это трактовалось как самостоятельность только русских княжеств (ведь на таких же условиях входили в ее состав булгарские эмираты, ряд балканских, крымских и северокавказских княжеств). Иными словами постулируемый «застой» происходил не в реальной жизни, а в представлениях автора учебника.
Подобные лекала применялись и для описания истории татарских государств.
«После распада Золотой (позже Большой) Орды на ее территориях возникли государства, считавшие себя ее преемниками. А это означало притязания на дань с Руси и постоянные грабительские набеги. Во второй четверти XV в. образовалось Казанское ханство. В его состав, помимо татар, вошли потомки волжских болгар, мари, удмурты, чуваши, часть мордвы, часть башкир. Правящие круги этого феодального государства стремились к обогащению за счет соседних народов.
...В Крыму возникло Крымское ханство со столицей в Бахчисарае. Феодальная скотоводческая знать часто предпринимала грабительские походы в соседние страны, стремясь захватить побольше добычи для продажи в рабство или для получения выкупа... Крымское ханство вступило в вассальную зависимость от Турции и стало на длительное время опасным очагом агрессии против украинских и русских земель.
…Возник опасный для России широкий фронт враждебных ей государств. Участились опустошительные набеги со стороны Казани и Крыма, что наносило огромный ущерб России. Особенно обострилась обстановка после утверждения в Казани враждебной Москве династии из Крыма. В Казанском ханстве находились многие десятки тысяч захваченных в плен русских людей. Решено было перейти к активным действиям против Казани».
Схема описания татарских государств та же, что и Улуса Джучи - завоеватели и грабители, которые существовали за счет угнетаемых местных народов и разорявших русские земли. Нет ни слова о высокой городской культуре татар, в том числе литературе и искусствах, развитых ремеслах и торговле. Не говорится и о постоянных набегах ушкуйников-пиратов и казаков на города Поволжья и Крыма, о завоевательных походах русских князей на земли татарских ханств. Особенно усердно в головы учеников вкладывалась идея оправдания русских завоеваний и прошлыми притеснениями и «турецко-мусульманской» военной угрозой, и потенциальной враждебностью татар. Тем самым имперская идея получала дополнительные «исторические» аргументы и формировала у русских школьников негативное представление о прошлом соседних народов, их культуре и быте, вырабатывала конфронтационное сознание, представление о собственной исключительности. Для татар же это, в свою очередь, создавало комплекс национальной неполноценности, вело, с одной стороны, к маргинализации сознания, культивируя впечатление о том, что им в своей истории нечем гордиться, а с другой - давало повод подчеркивать свою постоянную враждебность Русскому государству и говорить об игнорировании татарской истории, требуя «разделить» историю, написав свои учебники.
Таким образом, школьники получали неполную, искаженную и тенденциозную историю, пропагандирующую идеи национальной вражды, которая, не прекращаясь, велась и ведется до сих пор, деления народов на «плохих» и «хороших», на «старших» и «младших» братьев. Все это служило целям формирования и закрепления имперского державного сознания, вызывая ответный всплеск националистических эмоций у нерусских народов..."
|| 9 Dec 2002, 23:25|
Прокламируемый интернационализм был чуть закамуфлированным русским шовинизмом
"Как было положено рисовать народы СССР? Все народы в национальных костюмах - только русские в трусах и пионерском галстуке." -- Глазунов, великий русский художник 20-го века.
Что-то здесь не так. Русских партия "обобщила" самых первых. Если трусы с пионерским галстуком - русская национальная одежда - то действительно "прокламируемый интернационализм был чуть закамуфлированным русским шовинизмом".
|10 Dec 2002, 15:00|
||19 Dec 2002, 05:49|
В.Войнович так говорил про то как изображались межнациональные отношения во времена "социалистического реализма":
"Если в романе фигурирует, к примеру, таджик, то он обязательно должен был быть хорошим, а русский в этом романе должен был быть еще лучше, и немножко умнее - как-никак "старший брат"!
||19 Dec 2002, 06:10|
Не совсем так. Как и сейчас в американском кино - если в фильме присутствуют на ведущих ролях и белые и чёрные - самый страшный негодяй может быть только белым, либо хорошие чёрные будут компенсировать и побеждать плохих.
Хоть один советский фильм был - где нерусский (из СССР, понятно) был самым страшным негодяем, а русские были только лучше его? И чтобы не было противовеса плохому в лице соплеменника. В Белом Солнце Пустыни присутствовал противовес - хороший-плохой нерусский.
||19 Dec 2002, 22:06|
Ответ нику Some1 (2002-12-19 06:10)
Что-то я не понял, о чем ты говоришь. Ты же так и не опровергнул слова Войновича: хороший нерусскийи, но обязательно русский умнее и "хорошее".
||20 Dec 2002, 02:13|
Ответ нику Vorga (2002-12-19 22:06)
Я говорю о том как изображались межнациональные отношения во времена "социалистического реализма". Войновичу в пику ничего не собирался сказать, а только дополнить не "совсем так", а "ещё".
Ни один народ не был показан как носитель зла. Но самыми страшными негодями могли быть показаны либо русские, либо хорошие "нерусские" должны были компенсировать плохих "нерусских".
Даже авторы из Средней Азии, как Айтматов придерживались правила - Первый учитель - бай-насильник и первый учитель (положительный персонаж) - оба киргизы. Я ничего не перепутал? Читал то давно.
||20 Dec 2002, 02:26|
Да, вспомнил, есть пример явно не по Войновичу: фильм года 40-50. Там царь Пётр отправляет учиться сынков высокопоставленных сановников - естественно русских. Перед тем как их коммандировать на Запад, он их учит "саморучно". Один из дородных и самодовольных "деток" показывает полное отсутствие способностей и не может назвать паруса. Его денщик азиатской национальности - (не помню как его звали) все паруса давно знает и пытаясь выручить господина подсказывает слишком громко. Пётр ловит его за ухо, вытаскивает к доске и просит назвать паруса. В последствии этот парень едет учится, становится морским офицером и т.д.
Я случайно запомнил, что эту роль играл казах. Кто помнит подробности?
|20 Dec 2002, 08:53|
Ответ нику Akskl, 2002-12-19 05:49
"Если в романе фигурирует, к примеру, таджик, то он обязательно должен был быть хорошим, а русский в этом романе должен был быть еще лучше, и немножко умнее - как-никак "старший брат"!
А как надо было? Немножко глупее? Немножко похуже? Или с сантиметром и ножницами каждый персонаж подравнивать?
Насколько понимаю говорится о фильмах-романах про время до 50 годов. И неужели для кого-то открытие что русские играли роль в то время культуртрегерскую для тех же таджиков, да и для всей СА?
Что "средний" русский в СА был "умнее" "среднего" таджика или казаха?
Такую-же культуртрегерскую роль играли скажем немцы в России в свое время. И что теперь делать? Как выражается наш друг дервиш, волосы из одного места рвать, доказывая что нет-нет-нет русские отродясь умнее немцев были?
Я предпочитаю сказать им, немцам, большое спасибо.